Russia’s nuclear energy diplomacy in the Middle East: why the EU should take notice.  EPC Policy Brief, 21 February 2017 by Giuli , Marco
Russia is not a new player in the energy sector of the MENA (Middle East and Northern Africa) region. However, its
nuclear energy diplomacy in the region received a further impetus in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the
Russian military intervention in Syria. This paper first outlines Russia's predicament and political priorities in the
MENA after the Arab Spring; second, it describes the state of play with respect to Russia's nuclear energy
diplomacy in the region; finally, it puts into perspective the effectiveness of the energy tool for Russian political
ambitions. It is argued that, despite several complementarity factors between Moscow's political and commercial
interests and those of several MENA leaders, a transactional political environment and uncertain market dynamics
complicate the prospects for long-term energy deals that require huge investments, and suggest that it is up to
Europe, in its own interest, to offer a better vision for the region's energy future.
BACKGROUND
Moscow and the Arab Spring: challenges and opportunities
The Arab Spring and its consequences were and are still seen by Moscow as a challenge and, at the same time, an
opportunity. Russia reads the events of 2011 as a Middle Eastern version of the coloured revolutions in its near
abroad. In the Russian foreign policy establishment's view, the uprisings were carried out by US-backed civil
society organisations whose ultimate aim was to overthrow legitimate governments and replace them with 
US-sponsored vassals. This process, the Russian discourse goes, started with a regime change in Iraq; the following
instability poses a threat to Moscow's interests and influence in the region, and raises the possibility of radical
Islamic outbreaks within Russia itself. The longstanding position of Russia is that the defense of sovereignty always
precedes the promotion of democracy and human rights, and authoritarianism in the region is necessary to
prevent chaos.1
Rebel movements in the region – from Libya to Syria – see Russia predominantly as an enemy. However, with
some few exceptions, which have either led to democratic transitions (Tunisia) or civil war (Libya, Yemen, Syria
and partially Iraq), the post-2011 regional leaderships remain authoritarian and in many ways share with Russia
the fear of external interferences and street protests. Also, many Arab leaders are increasingly skeptical about the
future of the US' security commitment to the region. Even worse, some of Washington's traditional Arab allies fear
that the Obama administration was engineering a new regional setting, together with their Iranian archenemy. This
perception is also encouraged by the US' shift towards energy self-sufficiency, which is expected to reduce the
strategic significance of these countries for Washington2, and might be confirmed by the Trump's administration
domestic focus regardless of what its policy towards Iran will be. In such a situation, it does make sense for the
countries of the region to demonstrate that they can resort to other partners. All this comes as an opportunity for
Moscow, which wants to be recognised as an indispensable actor for any kind of effort aiming to settle the future
of the region. Putin has used energy cooperation to break the isolation of Iran and obtain a role in the negotiation
of the nuclear deal. Such a model could be replicated with other countries that are uncomfortable with the
perceived shift of the Obama administration in the region, such as Egypt, Turkey, or the Gulf countries, as they
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need to provide affordable energy to a growing population (primary energy consumption rose by 56% over the
last decade in the Middle East) and some of them intend to catch up with Iran's nuclear capabilities.
Although Russia is well-known for using gas pipeline politics to advance its foreign policy agenda, it is increasingly
using its other energy asset – nuclear energy – to reconnect with the MENA region. State-controlled nuclear energy
giant Rosatom was authorised by the Kremlin to invest up to USD 350 bn for the coverage of upfront costs of new
power plants, in Russia and abroad.3 Rosatom, led until 2016 by former prime minister and Putin's close ally
Sergej Kiryenko, is the world's only 'full cycle'4 nuclear firm, operating under a 'build-own-operate' model aiming
at building up a strategic presence and locking partners into a long-term mutual dependence. A number of deals
and memorandums have been signed with almost all MENA countries, with the exception of Israel, which is not a
signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
STATE OF PLAY
Russia's nuclear deals in the MENA
Iran represents the most successful model for Russia's use of nuclear energy cooperation to advance its strategic
priorities vis-à-vis Washington. Rosatom completed the first 1 GW power plant at Bushehr in 2011, which was
connected to the grid and started operations in 2013. A contract was then signed in 2014 for the construction of
four more reactors at the same site. Russia enabled Iran to advance its nuclear programme despite the sanctions,
becoming de facto an indispensable part of the negotiations leading to the nuclear deal. Remarkably, Russia has
economically suffered from this development. Teheran's desire to restore its oil output to the pre-sanction level of
4 Mbl/d contributed  to the oil price war triggered by Saudi Arabia in late 2014, which brought the Russian
economy to its knees. However, the Russian leadership sees the strategic benefits as more important.
Russia was the first country visited by President al-Sisi after seizing power in Egypt. Moscow praises his repressive
restoration of order, seen as an antidote to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. By approaching Russia, Sisi
signaled to the US that it will be difficult to isolate Egypt even in case of embarrassing authoritarian spirals. The
country's nuclear ambitions gave Russia a perfect opportunity to start cooperation. In 2014, the two countries
signed an inter-governmental agreement for the construction of a power plant in El Dabaa, including four reactors
of 1.2 GW each. The plant is supposed to start operations in 2022 and relies upon Russian upfront financing. 
With scarce resources and a 7% annual increase in electricity demand, Jordan selected Rosatom for the
construction of the USD 10 bn Qasr Amra power plant (2GW), which should cover up to 40% of the country's
generation capacity. The deal entered into force in 2013 and the plant should be ready by 2022, with Rosatom
funding 49% of its construction. In this case, Russia provided a second-best option after Jordanian attempts 
to develop a nuclear partnership with the US were frustrated by the American opposition to indigenous 
uranium enrichment.
Algeria has been planning to build up nuclear reactors since 2001, and the government is now establishing 2025
as a deadline for the completion of a nuclear power plant. An intergovernmental agreement with Russia was
signed in 2014, although Algeria is keeping other options open, and small research reactors were developed in
cooperation with China and Argentina.
Despite evident rivalry ranging from the support to opposit sides in Syria to the oil price war triggered by Riyadh,
Russia and Saudi Arabia have always avoided an excessive deterioration of their bilateral relationship. Russian
diplomacy is carefuly monitoring the worsening relations between the former US administration and 
their traditionally closest Arab ally in the region. Saudi Arabia plans to build up 17 GW capacity of nuclear 
power and 41 GW of solar power by 2032. The Saudi's distrust of the US-Iran deal has increased Riyadh´s interest
in developing domestic nuclear civilian capabilities to catch up with the technological state of play of its
archenemy. A cooperation agreement was signed with Russia in 2015, and a joint nuclear coordinating
committee was established.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are in the final phase of developing their first reactor, expected to start operations
in 2017 and aimed to provide 25% of the country's electricity needs by 2020. The country undertook the most
credible long-term commitment to a civil nuclear programme, developed with the Korean KEPCO. Even though
Rosatom is not building the plant, it managed to secure a fuel lease deal on the model of the Iranian one – as a
US-UAE agreement in 2009 prevents the Emirates from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel on their
territory. An agreement that the UAE is calling into question after the Iran deal.
Energy vulnerability is particularly acute in Turkey. The country depends on Russia for 70% of its gas supply.
Pipelines are often the target of non-state-actors' attacks in the east, and storage and re-gasification capacity is
limited. In 2010, Russia and Turkey agreed to build up a four-unit nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, for USD 20 bn and
4.8 GW of capacity, expected to start operations in 2033. The deal unraveled in the aftermath of the downing of a
Russian jet by the Turkish air force in the context of the Syrian crisis. However, Russia proved reluctant to abandon
the project despite the political standoff, and cooperation resumed as the two countries mended their fences. 
Considering the region's political instability, and the growing competition of gas and renewables, most of these
deals should be read as diplomatic posturing, satisfying occasional common diplomatic interests rather than laying
the bases for an energy overhaul of the Middle East within the framework of stable political partnerships between
Russia and these countries. However, Europe should be concerned by the fact that Russia is playing
opportunistically in the MENA with an energy instrument that nourishes local autocrats' designs, introduces
elements of risks related to the proliferation of nuclear material in a region plagued by terrorism and sectarian
violence, and complicates efforts to build up a pragmatically crafted regional security architecture – one of the
long-term ambitions of the recently released EU Global Strategy.5 The next session will focus on the unlikelihood of
a nuclear future for the region, and on why it is fundamental for Europe to offer an energy alternative.
PROSPECTS
Has nuclear energy a future in the MENA?
The long-term nature of investments in nuclear energy, reflected by high upfront costs (planned reactors in the
MENA show an estimated capital expenditure ranging between  USD 20 bn and  USD 80 bn), does not fit well in
an increasingly unstable region. The Akkuyu plant ordeal in Turkey demonstrates how unstable political relations
are likely to affect economic links. Beside fluctuating relations between states, one should also consider the
growing threat of non-state actors targeting critical infrastructures – a risk that could be better weathered by
smaller and easily deployable energy facilities, like gas and renewable energy (RES). 
Combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) power plants can be more rapidly built and operated, at a lower cost. In the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, with current technology and under the assumption of 22 USD/ton CO2
emissions price, total generation costs are estimated at 52.4 USD/MWh for gas and 60.5 USD/MWh for nuclear.6
It was calculated that – considering a 10% discount rate – nuclear may become convenient in case of a
hypothetic carbon price above 30 EUR/ton across the region, which is nowhere to be seen at the moment.7
Renewable energy is also gaining traction in the region. Long-term contract prices for newly commissioned RES
installations range from 41 and 77 USD/MWh, lower than in any other region in the world.8 Still, non-hydro
renewables accounts for about 1% of power generation in the MENA, which still prefers oil and gas to
accommodate rising electricity demand.
Redesigning the EU's approach
The EU and its members have at their disposal more sophisticated and diversified instruments than Russia to
address the MENA's growing energy needs. These should be used to enhance stabilisation and prevent
opportunistic incursions of more politically agile – but ultimately destabilising – actors such as Russia in a region
that is vital for the Union's long-term strategic interests. However, this requires a redesign of current European
energy policies towards the Mediterranean. 
So far, the EU approach to Mediterranean energy cooperation focused on a regional governance approach as
opposed to targeted commercial diplomacy. The EU tried to promote its regulatory acquis in the region, notably
through network efforts (such as the MedReg initiative, aimed at enhancing technical cooperation in policy
networks), with the objective of making the local regulatory environment more attractive to investors. It did not
apply means of commercial diplomacy, which rely on targeted and coercive state instruments9 and is therefore
rather associated with the foreign policy interests of state actors. 
So far, the EU approach had a poor record in the MENA region, as it operated under less than ideal conditions: little
regional integration, no conditionality, a lack of ownership by member states, and a focus on the EU as a market
outlet rather than local needs.
A more effective approach should ideally combine governance (in terms of objectives) and commercial
diplomacy (in terms of targeting and conditionality) on the basis of a proper understanding of the regional energy
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priorities and ongoing political re-profiling. In order to do so, the EU needs to develop a shared narrative, clear
focus, and a coordinated methodology.
The narrative promoting rules diffusion should focus on supporting and enhancing the ambitions of MENA
countries' decarbonisation pledges presented in Paris, rather than on the implicit virtues of EU regulation. This
would contribute to the Union's climate leadership in a moment where multilateral climate efforts are undermined
by political shifts in the US. 
In terms of focus, action needs to concentrate on specific local barriers to RES deployment10 and energy efficiency,
such as institutional capacity, grid inadequacy as well as uncertainty about investment returns and market access.
This requires technical assistance – notably in the public procurement area, and risk-mitigation instruments.
In terms of methodology, a coordinated and consistent division of tasks is needed between multilateral financing
vehicles focusing on risk-mitigation for investors, the diplomatic intruments of member states targeting specific
MENA partners with incentives and conditionality, and EU assistance in improving institutional capacity. To this
extent, the focus of the EU's Energy Diplomacy Action Plan11 on "underpinning initiatives that promote sustainable
energy markets in partner countries and in key third countries, based on EU know-how using safe and sustainable
low-carbon technologies and system solutions" is a step in the right direction. However, it needs ownership by
member states and coordination with initiatives such as the External Investment Plan12 proposed by the European
Commission in 2016 and funding instruments such as the European Fund for Sustainable Development13, which
should earmark part of the EUR 3.35 billion forseen budget for a socially sustainable energy transition.
All in all, Europe needs to upgrade its external energy actorness in the MENA for the sake of its own stability. The
historic pattern of developing bilateral hydrocarbons' trade between European and MENA countries under a
security umbrella provided by the US needs to be revised. This needs to be done not only because of Washington's
increasingly erratic role and the consolidation of the presence of third actors – not necessarily benign – such as
Russia, but also due to the challenges and opportunities provided by the climate agenda and the rising MENA
energy demand. If the Union and its members do not live up to the task of responding to MENA pressing energy
needs, it will miss an opportunity to shape the future of a strategic neighbourhood, to the benefit of new
international competitors.
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